Abstract-Content sharing based on device-to-device (D2D) communications has been regarded as a promising technology to offload traffic from the overburdened cellular networks. Efficient D2D content sharing requires an incentive mechanism to encourage mobile devices to participate, and the optimal contentprovider selection scheme is also necessary if multiple candidate providers exist. In this paper, we propose a comprehensive scoring mechanism (CSM), which calculates a score for each candidate content provider based on their historical content supply record, current transmission rate, and expected reward. The CSM establishes the relationship between the historical content supply record and the expected reward, and makes it possible to select the content provider with an achievable transmission rate appropriate for the requested content. Based on the CSM and the Hungarian algorithm, we propose a Content-sharing Incentive and Provider Selection (CIPS) algorithm to optimize the selection of content providers for multiple concurrent content requesters. Through extensive simulations, we show that the proposed CIPS algorithm can effectively motivate mobile devices to participate in content sharing and can select the most appropriate content provider(s) from multiple candidates.
Incentive Mechanism and Content Provider Selection
for Device-to-Device-Based Content Sharing I. INTRODUCTION W ITH the increasing demand for various mobile services and applications, cellular networks are expected to face a capacity crunch in the near future. In order to offload traffic from the cellular eNodeBs (eNBs), device-to-device (D2D) communications underlaying cellular systems [1] have been widely considered in the design of the fifth-generation (5G) mobile systems. For example, the authors of [2] proposed a D2D relay algorithm to enhance the Quality of Experience of users in software defined multi-tier LTE-A networks, and they also analyzed the D2D system performance with Poisson Point Process in [3] . In [4] , the authors designed a D2D communication assisted mobile traffic offloading (DATO) scheme, with focus on massive connections for machine type communications. In [5] , the authors employed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles to promptly construct the D2D-enabled wireless network in remote, rural and disaster affected areas. Furthermore, [6] developed a planned opportunistic routing scheme for delay-constrained data transmission in mobile opportunistic D2D networks, and The authors of [7] proposed a near-optimal solution for the joint resource block assignment and transmit power allocation based on interference graph.
In this work, we focus on the D2D content sharing problem, i.e., when the content that a user equipment (UE) wants to download is available on some nearby UEs, the eNBs can assign one of them to provide the requested content via D2D communications [8] instead of downloading from the internet, which can significantly reduce the traffic load of the cellular networks and improve the network spectral efficiency. However, D2D based content sharing faces two major challenges: i) how to motivate UEs to actively participate in content sharing; and ii) how to select proper content providers from candidates and ensure the quality of service (QoS) simultaneously.
Nowadays, most of the UEs are smart devices with advanced computing, processing, and storage capabilities. Sharing content via D2D transmissions will benefit both the content requesters (CRs) and the network, while introducing extra energy consumption for the content provider (CP) UEs, which may prevent the rational or selfish UEs from participating in D2D content sharing [15] , [16] . Therefore the network should provide effective incentive mechanisms to motivate UEs to participate in the content sharing wherever possible. In the incentive mechanism design, three issues should be considered: the predicted transmission rate of a CP, its historical content sharing record, and its reward to be paid by the network. The predicted transmission rate of a CP, mainly depending on the CP-CR channel conditions, will decide whether the CR's QoS can be satisfied by the D2D transmission. The historical content sharing record of a CP reflects whether it has been actively and safely sharing content with others (e.g., not trying to send spam messages or malicious files during the D2D content sharing). For a CP's reward, from a Contract-Theory perspective [15] it should consist of two parts: one part is to compensate the CP's cost in D2D transmission, and the other part is its expected profit. A proper reward design should both effectively motivate the CPs to participate in D2D content sharing actively and control the cost of the network via competitions among CPs.
In a densely populated network, it is likely that when multiple UEs may request contents simultaneously from a common set of candidate CPs (where each CP has cached some or all of the 0018-9545 © 2019 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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requested contents). In this case, the network need to optimally assign the CPs to the CRs. Since one CP might be preferred by multiple CRs, the joint design of the CP selection and the incentive mechanism becomes a highly complicated problem. To address the aforementioned issues, in this work, we study incentive mechanism design and content provider selection for D2D content sharing considering the long-term behaviors of UEs. We first propose a comprehensive scoring mechanism (CSM), in which the comprehensive score of each candidate content provider is the summation of three scores: the score of historical content supply record (which is different from the reputation-based mechanisms [8] - [14] in that a continuous value is calculated to represent the historical content supply record instead of simply using a pre-defined reputation threshold to classify nodes into reputed and selfish ones), the score of predicted transmission rate (which makes it possible to select the content provider with a proper transmission rate for the requested content), and the score of the expected reward (which takes into account both the current and long-term UE performance as indicated by the other two scores). The proposed CSM can effectively motivate UEs' participation in D2D content sharing because: on the one hand, a candidate provider with a higher reputation will have a higher probability of being selected and receiving a higher reward, which can avoid the UE behavior of maintaining a reputation just above a threshold [10] ; on the other hand, the UEs will need to actively participate in D2D content sharing in the long term for achieving a high reputation so as to receive a high reward. In addition, we introduce the concept of QoS sensitivity threshold. If the disparity of transmission duration due to different data rates is less than the QoS sensitivity threshold, then the score of predicted transmission rate will be considered less important than the other two scores; otherwise, the score of predicted transmission rate will be put more emphasis on in order to ensure the QoS.
When multiple UEs request contents concurrently, it would be difficult (if not impossible) to select the best content provider for each content requester at the same time. In this paper, we model this problem as the optimization that maximizes the total score of the selected content providers for all the concurrent content requesters, and devise a content-sharing incentive and provider selection (CIPS) algorithm based on the CSM and the Hungarian algorithm [25] to solve this optimization problem. The CIPS algorithm includes two steps: 1) for each content requester, calculate the scores of all potential providers by using CSM; 2) arrange the scores of potential providers for all concurrent content requesters into a matrix and find the content providers whose total score is the largest for all the content requesters by using the Hungarian algorithm.
The novelty of the proposed CSM and CIPS can be summarized as follows:
r The CSM establishes the relationship between the historical content supply record and the expected reward of a candidate content provider. The expected reward is increased for a content provider every time it has successfully and safely shared content. As a result, UEs can be effectively motivated to actively participate in D2D content sharing in the long term.
r The CSM employs a new QoS sensitivity threshold in order to ensure that the selected content provider has a transmission rate appropriate for the requested content size and the associated QoS requirement.
r We formulate the problem of jointly optimizing the selection of content providers for multiple concurrent content requesters and propose the CIPS algorithm based on the Hungarian algorithm to solve it. To the best of our knowledge, this joint optimization problem has not been studied in the related literature. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II gives a review of related works. The system model for D2D content sharing is described in Section III. The comprehensive scoring mechanism is proposed in Section IV, and the contentsharing incentive and provider selection algorithm is presented in Section V. Simulation results are provided and analyzed in Section VII, followed by conclusions in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
There has been extensive research on the incentive mechanism to promote cooperation among UEs for content sharing, which generally can be classified into two categories: reputationbased and price-based. In a reputation-based incentive mechanism [8] - [14] , a node's reputation is built based on a collection of feedbacks from other nodes. In [8] and [10] , a pre-defined reputation threshold is used to classify nodes into reputed and selfish nodes, and only the reputed nodes can enjoy high QoS transmissions from the cellular networks and other nodes. The reputation aggregation and ranking were studied in [13] for peer-to-peer networks. In reputation-based incentive schemes, a clever node may manage to be considered as a reputed node by maintaining its reputation just above the threshold, rather than actively participating in content sharing to increase its reputation further. It has been shown that this will discourage the network nodes from actively participating in content sharing [11] - [12] .
Price-based incentive mechanisms [15] - [22] treat contentsharing services as transactions that can be priced and encourage UEs to participate in content sharing with an instant reward. The authors of [15] adopted the contract theory in resource allocation. A contract-based relay selection scheme was proposed in [17] . In [18] , a cheat-proof, credit based system was developed for stimulating cooperation among selfish nodes in mobile ad hoc networks. The authors of [19] proposed price competition incentive mechanisms for bandwidth trading and allocation. In [20] and [21] , virtual currency and micro payment were used to reward upload and charge download, respectively. A linear pricing scheme that maximizes the revenue of the network operator was investigated in [22] . However, the above price-based incentive mechanisms consider only the current transaction, regardless of UE behavior in the long term. In addition, game theory-based incentive mechanisms have been proposed [23] - [24] . In [23] , the authors investigated the profit maximization problem for the wireless network operator and the payment minimization for end-users. A marketplace based on the risk sharing concept was designed, where the tension between the operator and end-users, as well as the competition among end-users were formulated as a Stackelberg game. The incentive mechanism in [24] rewards those users that share contents with others via D2D communications, where the interplay between the BS and the users was formulated as a Stackelberg game to maximize their individual utilities.
In summary, the reputation-based incentive schemes focus only on historical contributions of the content providers and may not guarantee that the reputed UEs will continue provide high QoS for current D2D transmissions, while the price-based or Stackelberg game-based incentive schemes consider only the current capacities of the providers without checking their historical records and may select malicious UEs. This motivates us to design a comprehensive scoring mechanism to combine both current transmission capacities and historical records in this paper, so that the UEs can be effectively motivated to participate in D2D content sharing in the long term.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we present the system model for D2D content sharing, including the network model, the content sharing process, the channel model, and the interference analysis.
A. Network Model
In this work, we consider an Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM) based single-cell system, where there are M potential content providers, denoted as
and Z cellular UEs (CUEs) noted as Υ = {C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C Z }, whose uplink resources can be reused by content providers for D2D communications (i.e., the D2D underlay mode), as illustrated in Fig. 1 . These potential content providers, content requesters and cellular UEs are all mobile UEs randomly distributed in the cell and moving with pedestrian speeds. For simplicity, it is assumed that all the content providers and all the CUEs transmit with the constant power μ Q and μ C (μ Q ∈ (0, μ m ax ), μ C ∈ (0, μ m ax )), respectively , where μ m ax is the maximum value of transmission power. It is assumed that the content requested by any of the requesters has been cached by at least one of the content providers. If the requested file is very large, then it will be split into multiple small sub-files that each can be transmitted within the channel coherence time, and the content provider selection process will be performed for each sub-file separately.
The D2D content-sharing process includes the following steps: 1) The D2D-enabled UEs who would like to be a content provider will register to the eNB, and report their position periodically.
2) The content requester UE broadcasts a beacon, which includes a synchronization sequence, a channel estimation pilot sequence (both are predefined and known to all devices in the system), a time stamp, and the content request information. This beacon will be received by its serving eNB and nearby content providers. The nearby content providers will estimate the channel between them and the requester based on the beacon, and estimate their achievable data rate to the requester.
3) The eNB broadcasts the content request to the UEs within the D2D communication range to the requester. Only the UEs with the requested content will respond to the eNB and the others will keep silent. 4) If the eNB receives no response within a pre-defined period, which indicates that no potential provider is around the requester, then the eNB will send the content to the requester directly; otherwise, it will select the best potential provider to send the content via a D2D link. 5) The eNB will monitor the D2D transmission process until the content requester has successfully received the content. If the D2D content transmission process fails (e.g., a D2D link failure occurs or the D2D transmission rate falls below the content requester's minimum required data rate, which will be reported to the eNB by the requester) at some point, then the eNB will ask the selected content provider to drop the D2D session and will complete the remaining content transmission, and the reward to the selected content provider will be decreased accordingly.
B. Channel Model
In the channel model, path loss is assumed to be inversely proportional to the link distance with the distance exponent α, and all the links experience independent and identical frequencyflat Rayleigh fading, which results in a unit-mean exponential channel power distribution. Accordingly, the received power at the i-th content requester from the j-th transmitter is expressed as μ j h ij L −α ij , where μ j = μ Q and μ j = μ C are the transmitter power of Q j and C j , respectively, h ij and L ij are the Rayleigh fading power gain and the distance between the i-th content requester and the j-th transmitter, respectively.
C. Interference Analysis
As shown in Fig. 1 , we assume that one D2D pair can share the uplink resources of a CUE, and the content sharing process will be completed within the channel coherence time due to the low UE mobility. Assuming that Q j (j ∈ Φ) is selected as the content provider for content requester d i (i ∈ Ψ) to reuse the uplink RB of CUE k(k ∈ Υ), the signal-to-interference-plusnoise-ratio (SINR) of d i is expressed as:
where σ 2 is the power of the additive white Gaussian noise, L ik and L ij are the distances from interfering CUE C k and from provider Q j to content requester d i , respectively, h ik and h ij are the Rayleigh fading power gains between C k and d i , and between Q j and d i , respectively. Accordingly, the transmission rate (in bit/s/Hz) from content provider Q k to content requester d i is given by
IV. COMPREHENSIVE SCORING MECHANISM
In this section, we propose the CSM to calculate a comprehensive score of every potential content provider for each requester. The comprehensive score of a UE is the sum of the following three scores:
r The score of the historical content supply record, which shows how a UE has participated in content-sharing previously. The historical content supply record of each UE is stored at the serving eNB and can be updated by the eNB after each content-sharing process.
r The score of the currently achievable transmission rate, which is estimated by each UE under the current channel condition and will be used to calculate the expected reward. If the actual transmission rate is lower than the estimated achievable transmission rate, the actual reward paid by the eNB will be less than the expected reward.
r The score of the expected reward, which is a function of the transmission cost and profit. Accordingly, the comprehensive score of content provider Q j can be calculated as
where S 
A. Score of Historical Content Supply Record
In market transactions, a seller's success depends not only on good service and/or products, but also on the reputation accumulated in many previous transactions. Similarly, a potential provider with a better record of previous content supply performance is more likely to provide a higher QoS and would be more willing to participate in the current content sharing. Moreover, in order to avoid unsafe, or even malicious behavior (e.g., sending false content or even virus in content sharing), the safety record of potential providers should be included in the historical content-sharing score.
Accordingly, we define the score of historical content supply record for content provider Q j as
where W j and G j denote the score of historical contentsharing participation record and the score of historical contentsharing safety record of Q j , respectively, where
. The values of W j and G j will be updated according to the following process: The initial value of W j is 0. Once content provider Q j has successfully accomplished one content-sharing transmission, W j grows by a positive constant value δ (0 < δ < 1). If Q j has not participated in any content sharing during a certain time period τ (i.e., a time threshold), W j will be decreased by a value ν j , which grows linearly with the accumulated idle time T j when T j is greater than τ , i.e.,
where T j is counted from the end of the previous content-sharing participation to the start of the current content-sharing participation. From (5), we can see that if the idle time is less than the time threshold τ , W j remains unchanged; otherwise, ν j becomes larger than δ and W j will be decreased according to the accumulated idle time. Thus, the value of W j is updated according to content provider Q j 's participation in D2D content sharing as follows, Fig. 2(a) illustrates the relationship between W j and time t, in which we assume when t = 0, W j = 0.1, δ = 0.04 and τ = 2 (minute), and provider Q j participates in content-sharing at t = 2, 5, 7, 8 (minute). Therefore, W j increases by 0.04 at t = 2, 5, 7, 8 (minute). The idle time periods are 2 minutes (from t = 2 to t = 4) and 4 minutes (from t = 8 to t = 12). Therefore, W j is decreased by 0.04 at t = 4, 10 and 12.
The initial value of G j is ϑ, where ϑ > 0. The value of G j increases by a constant value φ (0 < φ < 1) every time provider Q j participates in a content-sharing transmission without any unsafe behavior. If provider Q j is found to have any malicious behavior in a content-sharing process, then its malicious behavior record ι j (which is initially 0) is increased by 1 and G j reduces to one ι j th of its previous value, i.e., Fig. 2(b) shows the relationship between G j and t, where we assume that the initial value of G j is 0.5, φ = 0.02, ι j = 1, given provider Q j completes a content-sharing transmission every minute, and has malicious behavior at t = 1, 5, 10 (minute). We can observe that G j decreases by a factor of 
B. Score of Predicted Transmission Rate
In the context of D2D content sharing, we define the score of predicted transmission rate in a way that links the estimated achievable transmission rate to the size of the requested content and the content requester's sensitivity to content transmission duration (i.e., the minimum difference in transmission durations that can be perceived by the content requester). For example, if the requested content has a size of X bits and it is available at two candidate providers with transmission rates R and R − m, respectively, where m (m > 0) is the difference between the two transmission rates, then the difference between the transmission durations of the two candidate providers is given by
Denoting ε as the QoS sensitivity threshold, in order to keep Ω t ≤ , we need to have
When the transmission rate difference m satisfies (9), the content requester would not notice the difference in QoS from the two candidate providers. In that case, the two candidate providers could have the same score of predicted transmission rate.
We denote the estimated achievable transmission rate of potential provider Q j as R j (j = 1, . . . , M) , and rank the M potential providers in the descending order of their rates, i.e., Q a 1 , Q a 2 , . . . , Q a M , where a i ∈ {1, . . . , M}, i = 1, 2, . . . , M, and R a 1 ≥ R a 2 ≥ · · · ≥ R a M . Based on the above discussion and definitions, we define the relationship between the scores of predicted transmission rate for potential providers Q a j + 1 and Q a j as follows,
where 
where ζ > 0 is a parameter that can be used to adjust the difference between scores of two adjacently ranked potential providers, and the value of b j increases with m j . If
where χ > 0 is a parameter that can be used to adjust the value of b j , and b j increases with m j . By using (10)- (12) and S R a 1 = 1, the scores of predicted transmission rate for all the potential providers can be calculated.
C. Score of Expected Reward
The score of expected reward for provider Q j is defined as
where P j is the expected reward of potential provider Q j , min M j =1 (P j ) is the minimum expected reward of all potential providers. Since a lower P j leads to a higher S P j , the eNB tends to select the potential provider requiring less reward. Here, P j is defined as
where A j denotes the cost of Q j in content-sharing participation, i.e., the cost of energy consumed in D2D content transmission from Q j to the content requester. A j can be expressed as
where ρ and μ Q denote the cost per unit energy and the D2D transmit power for content sharing, respectively, X and R j denote the size of the requested content and the D2D transmission rate estimated by Q j , respectively, and X ∈ (0, X m ax ), with X m ax being the maximum size of the requested content.
In (14), B j is the profit of provider Q j made from a contentsharing transmission. Following the market pricing model in [22] , we assume that the M potential providers are M competing suppliers in the market and define B j as
where η ∈ (0, 1) is an adjustable parameter, and S H j denotes the score of historical content supply record of provider Q j . We can see that, profit B j , which is calculated and is sent to each potential provider by the eNB, increases with S H j and decreases with M . On the one hand, a higher S H j is necessary for a potential provider to gain a higher reward, which encourages it to participate in content sharing actively and safely in the long term; on the other hand, more potential providers competing for supplying the same content will reduce the profit, which will encourage UEs to respond more to content requests with less competitors. Based on (15) and (16), (14) can be rewritten as
where S H j ∈ (0, 1), η ∈ (0, 1), M is a limited value [25] , thus
and P j are both bounded. In the content-sharing process, the content requester will send status information about the current D2D transmission to the eNB. If the D2D transmission of content fails at some point, the eNB will transmit the remaining content to the requester directly and the reward paid to the content provider will be less than the expected reward accordingly. If the D2D transmission fails after a size X of the requested content has been received by the requester, where X < X, then the actual reward P j is a fraction of the D2D content-sharing cost, i.e.,
If the D2D content-sharing transmission is finished, but the actual transmission rate R j is less than the estimated achievable transmission rate R j , then the actual reward P j is given by
V. CONTENT PROVIDER SELECTION ALGORITHM
Based on the CSM proposed in Sec. IV, the content provider with the highest score among all the potential providers will be selected for each content requester separately. However, when the N content requesters request contents concurrently, it would be difficult (if not impossible) to select the best content provider from the M potential providers for each content requester at the same time. In this section, we will solve the problem of optimally assigning content providers to multiple requesters.
A. Assignment Problem Formulation
Without loss of generality, we assume that a set N of content requesters share the same set of M potential providers, although different requesters may request different contents. Based on CSM, a score, S i,j , is calculated of provider Q j for content requester d i . Then, each of the originally calculated score is normalized as follows,
All the normalized scores are arranged into an M -by-N matrix S, i.e.,
We define an M -by-N indicator matrix, Y = (y i,j ) M ×N , where y i,j = 1 indicates that provider Q j is selected for requester d i , otherwise y i,j = 0. The problem of jointly optimizing the selection of content providers for multiple content requesters can be formulated as maximizing the sum of scores of all the selected content providers, i.e.,
If M ≥ N , N different providers can be selected for the N content requesters. If M < N, M providers are selected for M content requesters and the eNB will send the contents to the other N − M requesters. In the following, we present two lemmas to simplify the above optimization problem.
Lemma 1: If M = N , then matrix S remains unchanged. If M < N, (N − M ) rows of 0 will be appended to matrix S to transform it into an N × N square matrix S , i.e., Proof: The purpose of constructing matrix S is to adopt it in the objective function (20) , such as
Thus, the objective function with S is the same as the original objective function with S in (20), i.e.,
Similarly, it can be proved that the objective function (20) adopting S (by replacing S with S ) is equivalent to the original objective function with S as well. Lemma 2: Define
where
The optimization problem in (20) can be converted to
The solution to the optimization problem in (26) is the solution to (20) .
Proof:
To prove the solution of (26) is equal to the solution of (20), let's rewrite the objective function of (26) as (27) Because N i=1 N j =1 Ky i,j = NK or 0, minimizing the lefthand side is equivalent to maximizing the second term (without the minus sign) on the right-hand side, which is the same as the objective function in (20) according to Lemma 1.
B. Hungarian Algorithm
The optimization problem in (26) is an Assignment Problem [29] , which can be solved using the Hungarian algorithm [26] - [28] . The time complexity of the Hungarian algorithm is O(n 3 ) in the worst situation and the space complexity is O(n 2 ) [22] . The Hungarian algorithm is designed based on the following two routines [28] : (28) where
Routine II:
The zero elements of matrix F are marked as follows to identify independent zeroes. If there is only one unmarked zero element in a row, this zero element is marked as an independent zero, and the other zeroes in the same column are marked as non-independent zeroes; if there is only one unmarked zero element in a column, this zero element is marked as independent zero, and the other zeroes in the same row are marked as nonindependent zeroes. Repeated this marking process, until all independent zeroes have been marked.
In the previous subsection, when M < N, we transform matrix S to matrix S , and transform matrix S to matrix F, which satisfies the initial condition in the Hungarian algorithm [22] . In our proposed CIPS, we use ♣ to mark independent zero elements and ♦ to mark the non-independent zero elements in matrix F. Based on Routines I and II, the Hungarian algorithm can be implemented as follows:
Step I: Simplify matrix F . 1)
Step II: Find the independent zero elements. 1) Mark the zero element which is the only zero in a row (column) with ♣, then replace the other zero elements in the same column (row) of that ♣ with ♦.
2) Repeat (1) in
Step II to mark and replace as many zero elements as possible. 3) If there are still zero elements not marked or replaced, then first select the row with the least zero elements, find the column with the least zero elements among the columns containing the zero elements of the selected row, mark the common zero element of the selected row and the selected column with ♣, and then replace the other zero elements in the selected row and column with ♦. Repeat this step until all the zero elements are marked or replaced. 4) Denote the number of ♣ elements in matrix F as K. If K = N , the optimal solution to the assignment problem in (26) is obtained and the algorithm terminates. If K < N, go to
Step III.
Step III: Find the least number of rows and columns that can contain all the remaining zero elements in matrix F.
1) Mark each row without any ♣ with .
2) For each row labeled with , mark all the columns that contain a ♦ or a ♣ belonging to that row with . 3) Repeat (2) of Step III, until there is no more row or column that can be marked with . 4) Cross each row without with a horizontal line and each column without with a vertical line. The total number of lines is denoted by l, which cover all the remaining zero elements. If l = N , it must be wrong in the previous process, then go back to (3) of Step II. If l = N , go to Step IV.
Step IV: Introduce N independent zero elements in matrix F.
1) Find the minimum element θ among the elements that are not crossed by any line. 2) Subtract θ from each element of all the rows labeled with . 3) Add θ to each element of all the columns labeled with (to guarantee there is no negative element in F ); 4) Return to Step II. When the above algorithm terminates, we obtain a matrix F which contains only one ♣ element in each row and each column. That is, if F i,j = ♣, then, provider Q j is selected to transmit content to requester d i via D2D.
VI. PROPOSED CONTENT-SHARING INCENTIVE AND PROVIDER SELECTION ALGORITHM
In this section, we propose the complete content-sharing incentive and provider selection algorithm based on CSM and the assignment scheme in Section V, as illustrated in Algorithm 1.
When Algorithm 1 starts, the eNB knows the following information: set Φ, Ψ and Υ; each potential provider Q j 's historical content-sharing participation record W j and historical contentsharing safety record G j (j ∈ Φ); the size X i (i ∈ Ψ) of the contents requested by d i . For each d i , the eNB broadcasts the requested content index, size X i , and the location of d i (for extimating CSI and R j ) to the potential providers. If Q j has the requested content, it will respond to the eNB with estimated transmission rate R j and energy cost E j for sending the content to d i ; otherwise, it does not respond. Upon receiving the (4)- (7));
, (Eq. (13)- (17) (6) and (7)). end for response from Q j , the eNB will calculate the comprehensive score of Q j for d i , namely S i,j . Then, the matrix S is formed and transformed to F following (24)- (26), and the Hungarian algorithm is adopted as described in Sec. V-A to optimally assign providers to the requesters. For the requesters without any selected provider, the eNB will send the content to them directly. When the D2D content transmission from provider Q j to requester d i starts, requester d i will report to the eNB about the status of the D2D content-sharing session, and the eNB will pay provider Q j a reward accordingly. When the D2D session terminates, the eNB will update W j and G j according to (6) and (7), respectively.
VII. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we provide numerical results to illustrate the performance of the proposed CSM and CIPS algorithm. We consider a single cell with 10 content requesters and various numbers of content providers and CUEs. The size of requested content follows a logarithmic distribution between 0 M Bytes and 100 M Bytes [26] . The historical content supply record of each potential provider is a random variable uniformly distributed in [0,1]. The probability for each requester to demand one of the N available contents is 1 N . Other key parameters are listed in Table I . Each wireless link experiences pathloss and identical frequency-flat Rayleigh fading.
A. Performance of CSM
In Fig. 3 , we illustrate the maximum score, the minimum score and the score of selected provider (SP) among all providers calculated with CSM versus the total number of providers, which are all averaged among 1000 simulations. It can be observed in Fig. 3(a) that with the increasing number of providers, both the maximum S H and the S H of SP increase, while the minimum S H decreases. Fig. 3(b) shows that with the increasing of number of providers, the minimum S R decreases, while both the maximum S R and the S R of SP almost remain unchanged. In Fig. 3(c) we can observe that with the increasing number of providers, the maximum S P remains at one, the minimum S P decreases, and the S P of SP increases. Fig. 3 reveals that: i) the historical score and expected reward of the selected provider will increase as the candidate group becomes larger, as more potential providers will supply better choices for the requesters; ii) the S R of the selected provider is always high (close to but less than the highest S R of all candidates) regardless of the increase of the group size, since the highest data rate will also result in relatively low score in S P and may not bring the best total score; iii) the score of SP is not the highest in all three subplots, since S T reflects the balance of S H , S R and S P . Fig. 4 presents the probability of being selected versus S H , S R and S P . It reveals that with the increasing of S H , the probability of being selected increases until S H goes beyond 0.9, then the probability starts to decrease, since a very a high S H leads to a high reward, which can decrease S P significantly. Interest- Fig. 3 . The maximum score, the minimum score, and the score of SP among all providers versus the total number of providers calculated by the CSM. ingly, when S P < 0.35, no provider is selected; the maximum probability of being selected is achieved at S P = 0.4. It is because when S P is of a higher value, S H has a lower value, which decreases the probability of being selected. The inflection points in the curves of S H and S P reflect the relationship between them in the probability of being selected. It can also be observed that when S R < 0.75, no provider is selected, then with the increase of S R , the probability of being selected increases rapidly. It indicates that providers with higher transmission rates are more likely to be selected.
B. Incentive and Safety
We simulate the received rewards of three types of content providers (i.e., normal providers, negative providers and unsafe providers) in 10 content sharing events, so as to reveal the impact of CSM on the incentive and safety issues in D2D content sharing. A normal provider is always willing to share content with others and will never provide unsafe data files. A negative provider only wants to receive content from others but seldom provides content. An unsafe provider would like to share content but may provide files containing virus, worms, or trojan horses. Accordingly, a negative behavior refers to the act of a candidate provider refusing to share content, while an unsafe behavior refers to the act of a candidate provider sending false content or even virus to the content requester. In Fig. 5 , we set the initial values of W j and G j as W j = G j = 0.4, 0.6 and 0.5 for normal providers, negative providers and unsafe providers, respectively. It can be observed that initially the unsafe providers receives the highest reward because of its highest initial S H . However, its received reward suddenly drops at content sharing number 2 and 5 due to its unsafe behavior, and reduces to the lowest among the three providers after 10 content sharing processes. Similarly, the received reward of the negative provider is higher than the normal provider at the beginning , but suddenly decrease at content sharing number 3 and number 6 due to its negative behavior. But after some active participations, it finally increases to be the second highest. The received reward of the normal provider increases and becomes the highest at last. Fig. 6 shows the total received reward and the total expected reward of all three types of providers at the end of the simulation, where the expected reward is the reward which could have been gained if without any negative and unsafe behavior. It is obvious that the actually received rewards of both the negative provider and unsafe provider are much lower than their expected rewards, while the normal provider receives a reward equals to the expected value. Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 indicate that the proposed CSM would be able to discourage the negative and unsafe behaviors of providers by adaptively controlling their received rewards.
C. Performance of CIPS
We evaluate the overall performance of the proposed CIPS algorithm for multiple content requesters in Fig. 7 , in which the maximum comprehensive score is 1, and the average comprehensive score of the selected providers is the average score for 10 content requesters by using CIPS. It can be observed that the average comprehensive score of SP increases as the provider number getting larger. This is because the relative scores of each provider to each requester are different, more providers bring higher diversity such that each requester may be matched with a provider with better score.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have investigated the content-sharing incentive and provider selection problem for D2D communications underlaying cellular network. We propose the CSM, which calculates a score for each candidate content provider based on their historical content supply record, current transmission rate and expected reward. Based on the CSM and the Hungarian algorithm, we devise a content-sharing incentive and provider selection (CIPS) algorithm to optimize the selection of content providers for multiple concurrent content requesters. Numerical results have shown that the proposed CSM can promote UEs to participate in D2D content sharing actively and safely by controlling the received reward of providers and the proposed CIPS can improve the average comprehensive score of selected providers with the increasing number of content providers.
It should be noted that in realistic D2D content-sharing systems, the physical contact period within D2D communication range may impose a limitation on D2D content sharing. In our future work, we will investigate the life time of D2D pairs and the probability of content-sharing completion using realistic mobility models.
